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Abstract	Sleep	paralysis	is	an	experience	of	being	temporarily	unable	to	move	or	talk	during	the	transitional	periods	between	sleep	and	wakefulness:	at	sleep	onset	or	upon	awakening.	Feeling	of	paralysis	may	be	accompanied	by	a	variety	of	vivid	and	intense	sensory	experiences,	including	mentation	in	visual,	auditory,	and	tactile	modalities,	as	well	as	a	distinct	feeling	of	presence.	This	chapter	discusses	a	variety	of	sleep	paralysis	experiences	from	the	perspective	of	enactive	cognition	and	cultural	neurophenomenology.	Current	knowledge	of	neurophysiology	and	associated	conditions	is	presented,	and	some	techniques	for	coping	with	sleep	paralysis	are	proposed.	As	an	experience	characterized	by	a	hybrid	state	of	dreaming	and	waking,	sleep	paralysis	offers	a	unique	window	into	phenomenology	of	spontaneous	thought	in	sleep.		
	
Introduction	
“I	had	a	few	terrifying	experiences	a	few	years	ago.	I	awoke	in	the	middle	of	the	night.	I	was	sleeping	
on	my	back,	and	couldn't	move,	but	I	had	the	sensation	I	could	see	around	my	room.	There	was	a	
terrifying	figure	looming	over	me.	Almost	pressing	on	me.	The	best	way	I	could	describe	it	was	that	it	
was	made	of	shadows.	A	deep	rumbling	or	buzzing	sound	was	present.	It	felt	like	I	was	in	the	presence	
of	evil...	Which	sounds	so	strange	to	say!”	(31	year	old	man,	USA)		Sleep	paralysis	(SP)	is	a	transient	and	generally	benign	phenomenon	occurring	at	sleep	onset	or	upon	awakening.	Classified	as	a	rapid-eye-movement	(REM)	sleep-related	parasomnia,	SP	represents	a	psychophysiological	state	characterized	simultaneously	by	qualities	of	both	sleep	and	wakefulness,	wherein	the	experiencer	can	open	her	eyes	(Hishikawa	&	Kaneko,	1965),	can	be	aware	of	her	physical	environment	but	is	unable	to	move	and	may	start	seeing,	hearing,	feeling	or	sensing	something.		While	documented	instances	of	SP	seem	to	be	very	consistent	across	cultures	,	SP’s	lived	qualities,	phenomenology,	and	interpretation	as	a	meaningful	experience	varies	depending	on	the	cultural	and	religious	background.	Rooting	SP	in	a	particular	belief	system	may	either	help	the	experiencer	recognize	that	SP	is	common	and	transient,	or	amplify	negative	qualities	of	SP	by	giving	more	concrete	shape	to	an	already	terrifying	experience	of	a	supernatural	assault.		The	emotional	experience	of	SP	is	often	one	of	fear,	terror	and	panic.	Threatening	presences,	the	vulnerability	of	being	in	a	paralyzed	state,	uncontrollable	visions	-	all	these	elements	contribute	to	intense,	predominantly	dysphoric,	negative	affect.	Some	qualities	of	spontaneous	thought	associated	with	felt	presence	during	SP	can	be	seen	as	paranoid	(Cheyne	&	Girard,	2007),	spatial,	or	interpersonal/social	(Nielsen,	2007,	Solomonova,	2008).	The	vast	majority	of	SP	experiences	are	associated	with	intense	feelings	of	realism,	and	are	most	often	characterized	by	fear	and	distress,	which	may	carry-over	into	wakefulness	and	create	a	vicious	cycle	of	negative	emotional	association	with	sleep,	including	aversion	to	going	to	bed,	and	even,	in	extreme	cases,	can	result	in	symptoms	reminiscent	of	post-traumatic	stress	disorder	(McNally	and	Clancy,	2005).	Yet,	some	SP	experiences	are	described	in	positive	terms,	especially	vestibulo-motor	phenomena	that	include	out-of-body	experiences	(OBE),	or	sensations	of	flying	or	floating.	While	the	intuitive	and	immediate	reaction	to	SP	is	typically	negative,	as	will	be	discussed	in	the	section	on	practical	considerations,	there	are	numerous	reports	of	neutral/positive	SP.	Furthermore,	there	is	a	possibility	of	harnessing	the	power	and	potential	of	the	dissociative/overlapping	state	in	order	to	take	active	charge	of	
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one's	experience	and	to	use	the	opportunity	presented	by	the	simultaneity	of	waking	and	sleeping	cognition	-	a	potential	for	entering	into	a	lucid	dream	state	or	for	contemplative	self-observation.	Neurophysiologically,	SP	is	currently	understood	as	a	state	dissociation	or	a	state	overlap	between	REM	sleep	and	wakefulness	(American	Academy	of	Sleep	Medicine,	2014).	During	SP	one	can	open	her	eyes,	look	around	the	room,	become	aware	of	her	environment	and	simultaneously	experience	REM	sleep-related	paralysis	(muscle	atonia)	as	well	as	intense	and	realistic	imagery1	of	all	sensory	modalities	-	a	nightmare	spilling	into	the	real	world.	Normally,	during	REM	sleep,	skeletal	muscle	atonia	blocks	most	motor	output,	effectively	preventing	the	sleeper	from	acting	out	her	dreams	(Peever,	Luppi,	&	Montplaisir,	2014).	SP	can	also	occur	in	the	context	of	narcolepsy	(Sharpless	&	Barber,	2011;	Terzaghi,	et	al,	2012),	but	the	majority	of	those	who	experience	SP	report	it	in	its	isolated	form	(often	referred	to	as	Isolated	Sleep	Paralysis),	without	known	medical	or	neurological	association.	In	current	medical	and	neuroscientific	literature,	SP	is	discussed	in	terms	of	its	presentation	and	negative	factors:	SP-associated	mentation	is	generally	seen	as	a	non-desirable	effect	of	REM	sleep	intrusion	into	waking.	In	this	chapter	I	propose	that	situating	SP	experiences	as	a	dream	phenomenon	within	the	framework	of	embodied	mind	and	enactive	cognitive	science,	including	contemplative	approaches	to	consciousness,	is	an	alternative	that	accounts	for	the	phenomenology	of	SP	as	a	lived	experience,	allows	for	rich	and	detailed	cultural	framing	of	the	experience,	and	offers	avenues	for	a	cross-cultural	social	neurophenomenology	of	SP.		First,	I	will	discuss	the	phenomenology	and	neurophysiology	of	SP	experiences.	I	will	present	SP	in	general,	without	distinguishing	between	its	isolated	and	narcolepsy-related	form,	unless	such	a	separation	is	warranted.	I	will	start	by	presenting	the	current	state	of	knowledge	of	SP	prevalence,	as	well	as	the	varieties	of	imagery	accompanying	SP	and	their	cultural	significance.	I	will	then	discuss	SP	in	terms	of	a	REM	sleep	parasomnia	and	outline	its	precipitating	and	enabling	factors,	as	well	as	sleep	and	dream	characteristics	of	those	who	experience	SP.	Finally,	I	will	examine	SP	in	light	of	various	cultural	and	shared	practices,	including	preventative	measures,	and	practices	aimed	at	interrupting	and	transforming	SP	experiences.		The	experiential	examples	of	SP	used	in	the	present	chapter	are	all	derived	from	an	Internet-based	study	of	SP	(Solomonova	et	al,	2008).	Our	research	group	collected	193	responses	from	people	with	recurrent	SP	experiences,	using	a	modified	version	of	the	Waterloo	Unusual	Sleep	Experiences	Questionnaire	(Cheyne,	Newby-Clark,	&	Rueffer,	1999).	Our	participants	were	recruited	online,	using	word	of	mouth,	and	via	advertising	on	SP-related	forums,	information	and	support.	
Definitions	and	prevalence	Idiopathic	SP	(SP	not	associated	with	narcolepsy,	and	without	known	cause)	is	a	benign	and	transient	parasomnia	(Howell,	2012),	occurring	during	transitions	between	wake	and	sleep:	at	sleep	onset	or	upon	awakening.	The	Diagnostic	and	Statistical	Manual	of	Mental	Disorders	(DSM-5)	classifies	isolated	SP	accompanied	by	fearful	mentation	as	an	instance	of	a	nightmare	disorder	(American	Psychiatric	Association,	2013).	During	an	episode	of	SP,	characteristics	of	REM	sleep	intrude	upon	seemingly	awake	consciousness:	thus	the	person	experiencing	SP,	while	having	an	impression	of	being	awake	and	aware	of	her	environment,	is	unable	to	initiate	voluntary	movements	(i.e.,	experiences	REM	sleep	muscle	atonia/paralysis),	and	may	also	experience	intense	and	realistic	sensations	in	any	sensory	modality	-	REM	sleep-related	mentation	(American	Academy	of	Sleep	Medicine,	2014).	SP	should	be	distinguished	from	night	terrors	–	early	night	awakenings	with	feelings	of	panic/terror,	typically	associated	with	somnambulism-spectrum	arousal	from	slow	wave	(Stages	3	and	4)	non-REM	(NREM)	sleep.	Night	terrors	are	characterized	by	sudden	awakening	in	an	agitated	state,	anxiety,	body	motility	and	general	amnesia	with	regards	to	underlying	cognitive	experience	(Szelenberger,	Niemcewicz	&	Dabrowska,	2009).		Prevalence	estimates	of	SP	range	widely,	and	may	depend	on	geographic	and	cultural	factors.	A	systematic	review	of	SP	prevalence	has	revealed	that	studies	report	SP	lifetime	prevalence	from	as	low	as	1.5%	to	possibly	100%	in	the	general	population	(Sharpless	&	Barber,	2011).	The	authors	indicated	that	
                                                       1	In	this	chapter	I	will	use	the	terms	‘imagery’	and	‘mentation’	interchangeably	to	refer	to	visual,	auditory,	somatosensory	and	even	social	experiences	during	SP.	The	term	‘imagery’	here	is	therefore	not	restricted	to	the	visual	domain.	I	prefer	‘imagery’	and	‘mentation’	to	‘hallucination’	in	order	to	emphasize	the	dream-like	process	of	spontaneous	imagination	that	takes	place	during	SP,	and	to	de-emphasize	the	association	with	delusional	thought	and	pathologies,	associated	with	the	term	‘hallucination’.	
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about	one	in	five	individuals	may	have	experienced	SP	at	least	once	in	their	lifetime	(of	36,533	persons	in	their	review).	Prevalence	estimation	of	SP	is	difficult	due	to	numerous	factors	such	as	ethnicity	and	cultural	background,	including	variable	familiarity	with	the	phenomenon	and	in	the	wording	of	questions	(Fukuda,	1993).	For	example,	in	a	cross-cultural	study,	Fukuda	and	colleagues	(2000)	reported	that	while	it	is	unclear	whether	SP	is	equally	prevalent	in	Canada	and	Japan,	the	lack	of	familiarity	and	of	a	normative	cultural	framework	for	SP	in	Canada	may	contribute	to	the	fact	that	many	Canadian,	but	not	Japanese,	respondents	qualified	SP	as	a	kind	of	a	dream,	and	would	not	have,	therefore,	readily	recognized	SP	in	a	prevalence	study.		An	additional	reason	for	under-diagnosis	of	SP	in	the	West	may	be	the	fact	that	those	who	experience	SP	may	be	misdiagnosed	as	having	psychiatric	disturbances	(Hufford,	2005).	The	developmental	trajectory	of	SP	is	traditionally	associated	with	an	onset	during	adolescence,	which	may	indicate	a	process	associated	with	sleep	architecture	maturation	(Wing,	Lee	&	Chen,	1994).	However,	in	one	study	of	older	adults,	a	bimodal	onset	pattern	was	reported,	with	a	second	pattern	of	onset	of	SP	episodes	after	the	age	of	60	years	old	(Wing	et	al,	1999),	suggesting	a	possibility	that	SP	may	have	a	variety	of	onset	conditions.	Neurologically	and	phenomenologically	SP	is	situated	on	the	REM-sleep	based	dream/nightmare	continuum.	In	this	chapter,	I	will	approach	SP	experiences	as	a	variant	of	intensified	or	disturbed	dreaming,	and	will	situate	them	within	a	framework	of	embodiment	and	enactivism.		
The	4EA	cognition	and	oneiric	mentation	
	Recent	years	have	seen	the	development	of	a	paradigm	shift	from	a	strictly	neurocentric	view	of	the	mind,	a	position	that	can	be	stated	as	“embrained”	(Morris,	2010),	to	a	diverse	family	of	approaches	that	consider	the	mind	embodied	(Varela,	Thompson	&	Rosch,	1991;	Gallagher,	2005),	enactive	(Noe,	2004;	Thompson,	2005;	Stewart,	Gapenne	&	Di	Paolo,	2010),	extended	into	and	embedded	in	the	physical	and	social	world	(Clark	&	Chalmers,	1998;	Menary,	2010),	and	affective	(Colombetti,	2013;	Pessoa,	2013).	While	these	approaches	are	in	many	respects	quite	different,	they	have	sometimes	been	labeled	as	4EA	(embodied,	embedded,	extended,	enactive,	affective)	cognition,	with	a	common	theme	of	offering	a	robust	alternative	to	computational,	connectionist,	and	neuro-reductionist	views	of	the	mind	(Wheeler,	2005;	Protevi,	2012).	These	theories	attempt	to	situate	cognition,	brain	activity,	and	psychophysiology	within	the	larger	contexts	of	lived	subjective	experience,	by	emphasizing	the	roles	of	developmental	sensorimotor	attunement	to	the	world,	as	well	as	of	the	active	and	motivated	processes	of	perception	and	sense-making,	the	importance	of	the	social	and	cultural	milieu,	and	the	role	of	emotion	and	affect.	Sleep	and	dreaming	phenomena	have	been	only	rarely	addressed	by	4EA	theorists	(with	the	exception	of	Thompson	2014,	2015a,b),	and	the	prevailing	view	of	the	sleeping	mind	today	situates	sleep	mentation	as	being	firmly	constrained	within	the	brain	(Rechtschaffen,	1978;	Hobson,	Pace-Schott	&	Stickgold,	2000;	Revonsuo,	2006).	As	Revonsuo	states:	“The	conscious	experiences	we	have	during	dreaming	are	isolated	from	behavioral	and	perceptual	interactions	with	the	environment,	which	refutes	any	theory	that	states	that	organism-environment	interaction	or	other	external	relationships	are	constitutive	of	the	existence	of	consciousness”	(Revonsuo	et	al,	2015:	3).	Alternatively,	situating	dream	mentation	within	a	framework	of	4EA	approaches	implies	that	the	dreaming	subject	is	not	entirely	isolated	or	disconnected	from	environmental	and	somatic	stimuli,	and	that	her	experiential	self	retains	affective,	social,	sensorimotor	and	sense-making	qualities.	Dreaming	then	is	not	passively	lived	as	a	purely	mental	simulation	(Revonsuo	et	al,	2015),	but	can	be	seen	as	a	process	of	active	imagination	(Thompson,	2014)	rooted	in	the	dreamer’s	physical,	social	and	affective	world	(Solomonova	&	Sha,	2016).	I	propose	that	SP	experiences,	by	virtue	of	their	special	kind	of	overlap	between	and	simultaneous	presence	of	both	waking	and	dreaming	cognition,	are	perfect	candidates	for	neurophenomenological	research	on	spontaneous	thought	in	sleep,	which	would	help	illuminate	particular	qualities	of	dreaming	cognition	that	may	otherwise	be	inaccessible	to	reflective	consciousness	upon	awakening	from	a	dream.			 	
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Phenomenology	of	sleep	paralysis	experiences		
	
Figure	1.	A	representation	of	sleep	paralysis	experience2.	The	sleeper	is	awakened	suddenly	and	sees	a	menacing	shadowy	creature	on	top	of	him.	He	experiences	the	sensation	of	being	pushed	into	the	bed,	while	the	bed	itself	is	swirling	in	a	sort	of	a	tornado.	The	two	faces	of	the	dreamer	represent	the	“double”	consciousness	during	sleep	paralysis:	he	is	simultaneously	terrified	of	the	supernatural	attacker	and	also	knows	that	if	he	does	not	resist	the	experience	and	allows	himself	to	drift	back	into	sleep	he	may	have	a	lucid	dream	(this	lucid	consciousness	is	represented	as	a	sleeping	face	with	a	colorful	brain,	denoting	vibrant	possibilities	of	lucidity.	Artist:	Benjamen	Samaha,	Montreal,	Canada	2016.	Reproduced	with	artist’s	permission.		 In	addition	to	transient	experience	of	muscle	paralysis,	the	most	dramatic	quality	of	SP	is	its	sensory	content,	characterized	by	vivid,	intrusive	audio-visual	and	somatosensory	imagery.	The	experience	of	SP	can	be	extremely	realistic,	have	a	quasi-perceptual	and	wake-like	quality,	and	may	be	accompanied	by	tactile	and	kinesthetic	sensations.	Reflective	thought	processes,	self-awareness	and	metacognitive	abilities	seem	to	be	relatively	preserved	during	SP	experiences,	and	people	who	have	had	multiple	SP	experiences	may	develop	a	“feel”	for	recognizing	SP	imagery.		SP-associated	experiences	are	typically	referred	to	as	hallucinations	(hypnagogic,	when	occurring	at	sleep	onset,	or	hypnopompic,	when	happening	upon	awakening),	since	these	occur	during	otherwise	seemingly	awake	consciousness	(Liddon,	1967;	American	Academy	of	Sleep	Medicine,	2014).	This	entails	that	a	person	who	experiences	SP	sees	something	that	is	not	there,	something	that	is	distorted	or	false.	Such	a	view	presupposes	that	during	SP	one	is	effectively	awake	and	is	misinterpreting	her	experience.	Another	way	of	looking	at	SP	is	to	situate	it	within	the	spectrum	of	dream	mentation	and	dreaming	imagination.	While	dreaming	too	has	been	seen	as	a	delusional/hallucinatory	activity,	an	alternative	view,	in	line	with	embodied	mind	theories	and	enactive	approach,	has	also	been	proposed:	“When	you	hallucinate,	you	seem	to	perceive	
                                                       2	Excerpt	from	the	dreamer’s	account:	“The	transition	between	wake	and	sleep	is	a	crucial	moment	to	enter	into	the	world	of	dreams.	During	this	transition	on	countless	occasions	I	would	awaken	suddenly	not	being	able	to	move.	During	this	experience	it	seems	that	the	very	essence	of	fear	permeates	my	consciousness.	Eeriness	goes	through	my	soul,	freezes	my	blood	and	interrupts	all	substantial	notion	of	my	being.	No	words	can	describe	that	visceral	sensation,	and	in	parallel,	no	words	can	come	out	of	my	mouth.	Aware	of	the	lack	of	muscle	tonus,	I	try	to	escape	this	inevitable	Machiavellian	black	beast,	that	materializes	in	my	head	before	my	eyes	and	on	my	chest,	slowing	down	my	breathing.	Moreover,	my	senses	are	grabbed	by	an	impression	of	fighting	a	hurricane	that	may	drag	me	out	of	my	body.	This	cyclone,	that	has	a	black	hole	in	lieu	of	an	eye,	forces	me	to	fight	it,	and	this	fight	seems	crucial	to	my	survival	(…)	In	addition,	there	are	auditory	experiences,	an	amalgam	of	petrifying	words	and	vibrations	that	feel	like	sudden	gusts	of	wind	in	the	eardrums.	All	this	happens	when	by	body	feels	like	a	statue,	without	a	possibility	of	screaming.		(…)	On	occasion,	with	determination	and	lucidity,	I	can	have	power	over	this	swirl	of	stillness.	(…)	I	take	back	some	control	of	my	imaginary	hands,	and	then	I	hold	them	out	to	Morpheus	for	a	dazzling	and	colorful	dance	in	a	deep	and	enlightened	night”.	(Male	SP	sufferer,	also	diagnosed	with	narcolepsy.	Montreal,	Canada.	Account	translated	from	French).	
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what	is	not	there.	(…)	When	you	imagine,	you	evoke	something	absent	and	make	it	mentally	present	to	your	attention”	(Thompson,	2014:	179).	In	this	chapter	I	adopt	this	latter	view	and	will	refer	to	SP	experiences	as	variant	of	spontaneous	thought/mentation	or	mental	imagery,	rather	than	hallucinations	or	delusions.	
Kinds	of	sleep	paralysis	experience	A	factor	analysis	by	Cheyne	and	colleagues	(1999)	showed	that	SP	mentation	typically	falls	into	three	general	categories.	The	first	category	is	Intruder,	and	it	is	characterized	by	a	felt	presence,	fear,	as	well	as	auditory	and	visual	imagery.	The	person	who	experiences	SP	feels	that	someone	is	in	the	house	or	in	their	room.	This	experience	is	sometimes	accompanied	by	seeing	or	hearing	someone	or	something	sentient	move	around	the	house.	The	second	category	of	SP	experiences	is	known	as	Incubus,	in	which	the	felt	presence	is	interpreted	as	a	supernatural	assault	and	is	often	accompanied	by	a	sensation	of	shallow	breathing,	a	feeling	of	being	smothered,	pressure	on	the	chest,	or	pain.	In	this	case,	the	sleeper	often	sees	and	feels	the	maleficent	being	on	top	of	her.	The	third	category,	Unusual	Bodily	Experiences,	appears	to	be	a	separate,	less	well-known,	and	a	qualitatively	different	kind	of	SP	experience:	these	are	often	described	as	positive	events,	such	as	sensations	of	floating,	out-of-body	experiences	(OBEs),	and	feelings	of	bliss.	Both	Intruder	and	Incubus	categories	typically	include	the	experience	of	felt	presence	–	a	distinct	sensation	that	someone	sentient	is	in	the	immediate	vicinity	of	the	sleeper	(Cheyne,	2005).	Most	literature	on	SP	focuses	almost	exclusively	on	the	first	two	kinds,	Intruder	and	Incubus,	possibly	due	to	their	particularly	intensified	felt	presence	imagery,	which	contributes	to	distressing	SP	experiences	(Solomonova	et	al,	2008;	Cheyne,	2013).	However,	neutral	and	positive	instances	of	SP	have	also	been	described,	and	the	third	category,	Unusual	Body	Experiences,	or	vestibulo-motor	experiences,	is	often	characterized	by	pleasant	sensations	and	a	spirit	of	exploration,	accompanying	sensations	of	flying,	out-of-body	experiences,	or	autoscopy	(observation	of	one’s	own	body	from	an	unusual/novel	point	of	view)	(Brugger,	Regard	&	Landis,	1997).		
Felt	Presence	
“Just	before	going	to	sleep	or	if	awoken	suddenly	I	feel	as	though	a	presence,	usually	a	dark	shadow	
figure	is	standing	over	the	bed	staring	down	at	me,	or	pacing	back	and	forth.”	(22	year	old,	gender	not	reported,	USA).	 Among	all	SP	experiences,	felt	presence,	the	distinct	sensation	that	another	sentient	being,	human	or	not,	is	present	in	the	extracorporeal	space	of	the	experiencer,	is	arguably	the	most	salient,	terrifying,	and	rich..	Felt	presence	is	consistently	reported	as	the	most	common	SP-associated	experience	–	about	80%	of	episodes	(Cheyne	et	al,	1999),	which	produces	most	fear	and	SP-related	state	of	distress	(Solomonova	et	al,	2008).	One	salient	feature	of	felt	presence	experiences	during	SP	is	the	fact	that	it	is	a	distinct	sensation,	and	may	occur	in	the	absence	of	visual,	auditory,	or	tactile	imagery.	Felt	presence	experiences	during	SP	have	been	classified	as	a	paranoid	delusion	(Cheyne	&	Girard,	2007),	an	expression	of	spatial	social	imagery	(Nielsen,	2007),	and	as	a	variant	of	basic	intersubjective	experience	of	the	world	(Solomonova,	Frantova,	&	Nielsen,	2010).	Felt	presence	experiences	are	often	interpreted	within	the	cultural	framework	available	to	the	experiencer	(see	the	following	section	on	the	cultural	neurophenomenology	of	SP),	but	some	basic	characteristics	seem	to	be	common	across	cultures	and	ages	(Cheyne,	2001):	1)	felt	presence	often	manifests	from	ambiguous	stimuli:	it	is	often	described	as	“shadowy”,	and	its	physical	characteristics	are	often	unclear;	2)	the	experiencer	may	report	a	distinct	sensation	of	being	watched,	and	that	the	presence	has	some	intentions	towards	the	dreamer;	these	range	from	some	vague	interest	to	full-blown	assault;	3)	felt	presence	is	usually	accompanied	by	intense	emotions	(often	fear	when	the	presence	is	interpreted	as	threatening),	sometimes	to	the	point	of	a	distinct	feeling	of	dread,	imminent	death,	or	being	in	the	presence	of	evil.	Positive	emotions,	however,	are	also	possible,	especially	when	the	experience	is	understood	as	visitations	by	deceased	relatives	or	visions	of	the	divine.		
Intruder	Consider	the	following	examples	of	felt	presence	experiences	of	the	Intruder	type:	A	26-year-old	man	from	the	United	States	reports:	“It	felt	as	if	someone	was	watching	me	but	silently	standing	behind	me”.	In	this	example	the	presence	is	felt	in	a	distinct	and	clear	way,	but	not	seen	or	heard,	yet	the	experiencer	knows	where	in	space	the	presence	is	located.	Similarly,	a	29-year-old	woman	from	USA	regularly	experiences	the	
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malevolent	presence	without	ever	seeing	it:	“…feeling	of	evil	that	is	watching	or	monitoring;	never	able	to	actually	see	this	"evil	entity".	Even	in	the	absence	of	direct	visual,	auditory	or	tactile	imagery	she	feels	that	she	is	observed	and	that	the	presence	is	“evil”.	The	ambiguous	qualities	of	the	physical	attributes	of	SP	visitors	can	be	illustrated	by	the	following	two	examples.	A	39-year-old	man	from	USA	writes:	“The	"presence"	is	a	tall	black/darkest	grey	shadow	of	a	human	form	without	any	features.		It	stands	in	the	doorway	to	my	bedroom	waiting	to	be	"noticed".	Likewise,	a	30-year-old	woman	experienced	various	ways	in	which	the	presence	was	manifesting	during	her	SP	attacks:	“Once	it	seemed	a	shadow	was	leaving	the	room.	One	other	time	the	shadow	seemed	to	have	"wild"	hair	or	if	it	doesn't	have	hair	at	all,	it	looked	as	some	sort	of	black	something”.			
Incubus	The	Incubus	experience	happens	when	the	Intruder	physically	oppresses	the	sleeper,	sometimes	in	a	rather	dramatic	way.	In	words	of	a	52-year-old	man	from	the	United	States:	“My	worst	experience	was	being	choked	by	a	man	who	burst	into	my	bedroom.		The	experience	was	so	real	and	frightening	that	I	was	very	afraid	of	my	SP	for	many	months	after.”	The	Incubus	takes	many	forms,	including	human,	supernatural	and	more	rarely,	animal:	“I	often	hallucinate	creatures	like	large	cats	-	lions	or	tigers,	…	wrapping	themselves	firmly	around	me	and	crushing	my	body”	writes	a	20-year-old	woman	from	England.		Some	of	the	most	dramatic	and	potentially	traumatic	SP	Incubus	experiences	are	instances	that	are	lived	as	sexual	assault	or	alien	abduction.	Consider	the	following	example,	reported	by	a	40-year-old	man	from	the	United	States:	“When	it	is	a	"Dark	Man"	episode,	he	most	likely	touches	me.		Either	by	laying	across	my	body,	in	a	sexual	way	or	in	the	beginning,	he	would	grab	me	and	drag	me.		I	always	felt	that	if	I	let	go,	he	would	pull	me	out	of	my	body”.	Similarly,	a	29-year-old	woman	from	Spain	describes	her	distressing	SP	experience:	“…extreme	terror,	the	feeling	that	air	is	dense	and	darker,	that	shadows	boil	and	take	shape…	I	hear	some	low	tone	noises,	voices,	tactile	feeling	of	grabbing,	of	naked	cold	skin,	and,	very	rarely,	a	presence.	Very	dark	with	round	eyes,	spider-like	fingers,	that	laughs,	messes	up	the	bed,	and	makes	me	feel	terror,	with	some	sexual	approaches…”.	In	a	study	linking	reports	of	space	alien	abduction	to	SP	episodes	McNally	and	Clancy	present	this	case:	“…female	abductee…	was	completely	paralyzed,	and	felt	electrical	vibrations	throughout	her	body.	She	was	sweating,	struggling	to	breathe,	and	felt	her	heart	pounding	in	terror.	When	she	opened	her	eyes,	she	saw	an	insect-like	alien	being	on	top	of	her	bed”	(McNally	&	Clancy,	2005:	116).			
Positive	felt	presence	experiences	and	doubling	While	most	easily	recognizable	and	most	commonly	documented	cases	of	felt	presence	during	SP	have	to	do	with	a	threatening	and	ominous	“visitor”,	some	evidence	suggests,	however,	that	the	presence	is	not	always	understood	as	hostile.	Such	experiences	include	perception	of	friends	and	family;	visitation	from	deceased	relatives	or	benevolent	spirits;	and	erotic	encounters	where	the	sense	of	presence	is	comforting.	A	20-year-old	SP	sufferer	from	the	United	States	writes:	“Once	or	twice	I	have	thought	that	my	friend	or	roommate	was	standing	over	me.	I	was	confused	but	not	afraid.”	Similarly,	encountering	deceased	family	members	in	visions	or	in	dreams	can	be	experienced	as	a	positive	spiritual	event,	and	possibly	play	a	healing	role	in	processes	of	bereavement	(Garfield,	1996;	Belicki	et	al,	2003).	Finally,	another	rare	kind	of	SP-related	felt	presence	episode	involves	first	an	experience	of	“someone	there”,	and	then	a	doubling	of	the	dreamer’s	own	body,	a	self-projection	into	the	extracorporeal	space.	Some	individuals	report	that	the	felt	presence	entities	are	becoming	an	externalized	view	of	themselves:	“Sometimes	I	feel	that	the	presence	is	myself,	that	I	can	watch	myself”,	reports	a	21-year-old	man	from	Jamaica;	“I	switch	to	another	world	and	I	myself	become	a	presence”,	writes	a	19-year-old	man	from	Russia.		
Body	experiences	in	sleep	paralysis		 Most	(if	not	all)	SP	episodes	are	defined	by	an	altered	experience	of	the	body.	These	include	simple	experience	of	muscle	paralysis;	sensations	associated	with	supernatural	assault,	including	touch,	pressure	on	the	chest,	or	even	choking;	feelings	of	unusual	vibrations	or	falling	into	a	vortex;	and	out-of-body	experiences,	including	flying,	falling,	or	moving	around	one’s	house.		One	of	the	most	salient	features	of	SP	is	the	REM	sleep-related	muscle	atonia.	The	inability	to	move	is	a	striking	and	unusual	experience	for	most	individuals,	and	the	mismatch	between	sensing	the	body	and	the	
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loss	of	voluntary	control	over	the	body’s	movements	may	contribute	to	a	range	of	somatosensory	experiences.	As	discussed	above,	some	of	the	most	intense	SP	episodes	may	involve	a	feeling	of	being	assaulted	or	touched	by	a	supernatural	entity.	For	instance,	a	34-year-old	man	from	USA	describes	the	following	experience:	“Felt	my	arms	pinned	across	my	chest	in	a	strait	jacket	hold,	felt	hands	on	my	chest	pinning	me	against	a	wall”.	Perception	of	not	being	able	to	fully	breathe,	often	accompanied	by	feeling	of	pressure	on	the	chest,	may	be	prevalent	in	as	much	as	57%	of	SP	episodes	(Sharpless	et	al,	2010).	Although	most	accounts	of	and	research	on	SP	experience	have	centered	on	paralysis	accompanied	by	terrifying	mentation	and	by	felt	presence,	not	all	SP	experiences	are	characterized	by	imagery	and	many	are	simply	experiences	of	transient	body	paralysis	during	the	transition	between	sleep	and	wakefulness,	without	any	other	accompanying	mental	activity	(American	Academy	of	Sleep	Medicine,	2001).	Additionally,	SP	episodes	may	be	predominantly	somatosensory	in	nature:	Cheyne	(1999)	characterizes	these	experiences	as	Vestibulo-Motor	mentation.	Autoscopy,	out-of-body	experiences,	vibrations,	floating,	falling	and	body	doubling	experiences	(Cheyne,	2002)	are	all	possible	within	the	SP	framework	due	to	its	reliance	on	dream-supporting	REM	sleep	mechanisms.	During	a	dream,	especially	a	lucid	dream	(wherein	one	is	aware	of	the	fact	that	she	is	dreaming),	it	is	possible	to	have	simultaneous	experience	of	one’s	dream	body	and	real	body	at	the	same	time.	Thompson	(2014)	distinguishes	between	the	dreaming	self	(I	the	dreamer)	and	the	dream	ego	(I	as	dreamt)	as	two	coinciding	modes	of	self-experience,	which	may	sometimes	be	experienced	in	parallel.	The	dreaming	self	is	the	sleeping	self,	it	is	the	“I”	of	the	waking	life,	now	engaging	in	the	practice	of	sleep	and	dreaming.	The	dream	ego,	on	the	other	hand,	is	the	experiential	self,	immersed	in	the	dream	scenario.	The	I	as	dreamt	is	the	temporary	“I”	that	takes	on	the	first-person	perspective	as	a	subject	(and	sometimes	an	object)	of	the	dream	world.	Seen	from	this	point	of	view,	SP	episodes	may	represent	an	intense	experience	of	the	dreaming	ego,	lacking	a	dream	body	and	temporarily	“stuck”	within	her	immobilized	sleeping	body	of	the	dreaming	self/I	the	dreamer	while	experiencing	dream-like	mentation.	This	feeling	of	being	stuck,	coupled	with	awareness	of	the	overlap	between	states	of	vigilance,	may	then	transform	itself	into	a	situation	of	perceptual	doubling	of	body	imagery.	Contrary	to	most	SP	episodes	with	a	felt	presence	component,	some	bodily	experiences	are	described	in	quite	positive	terms.	For	instance,	a	20-year-old	woman	from	England	describes	this	characteristic	of	her	typical	SP	episode:	“Generally,	the	experiences	start	with	a	low,	pleasant	vibration	that	moves	through	my	body	in	defined	waves,	from	the	feet	up.		I	feel	them	most	strongly	in	the	throat	and	in	my	eardrums”.		Out-of-body	experiences	are	also	relatively	common	in	SP	–	as	much	as	39%	of	SP	experiencers	have	had	one	at	some	point	(Cheyne,	2002).	A	39-year-old	woman	from	the	United	States	writes:	“I	floated	out	of	my	bed	into	the	kitchen.		But,	as	I	floated	over	my	bed,	I	saw	like	this	beast	figure	crouched	over	on	the	front	of	my	bed.		I	floated	over	it	down	to	the	kitchen.		That	is	where	I	saw	this	beautiful	kaleidoscope-like	leaves.	They	were	so	vibrant	…	I	then	floated	back	to	my	room	into	my	body”.	In	this	example	there	is	a	combination	of	various	SP	characteristics:	dream-like	mentation	superimposed	onto	the	environment,	a	nocturnal	visitor,	and	an	altered	sense	of	the	body.	SP	experiences	are	also	sometimes	accompanied	by	false	awakenings—dreams	where	one	has	a	vivid	and	realistic	feeling	of	waking	up	in	their	own	bed	and	engaging	in	usual	activities	only	to	realize	that	they	are	still	asleep	(Buzzi,	2011).	While	false	awakenings	are	typically	characterized	as	dream	experiences,	their	phenomenology	in	terms	of	realism	and	possible	state	overlap	is	to	a	degree	similar	to	SP.	In	Cheyne’s	report	(2002),	58%	of	people	who	experience	SP	also	experienced	false	awakenings	at	least	occasionally.	Additionally,	false	awakenings	are	often	associated	with	feelings	of	dread,	anxiety,	and	oppression	(Green	&	McCreery,	1994;	Nielsen	and	Zadra,	2011),	similarly	to	SP.	The	following	two	examples	from	our	Internet-based	sample	illustrate	such	cases:	a	24-year	old	man	from	the	United	States	reports:	“…	sometimes	I	think	I	have	moved...	sometimes	even	gotten	up	and	walked	around	only	to	find	that	I	never	got	up	at	all.”	In	a	similar	vein,	a	21-year	old	man	from	Jamaica	describes	his	experience:	“I	will	wake	up	into	another	dream	inside	my	bedroom	and	think	I	am	awake	and	realize	I	am	still	sleeping	minutes	later	and	the	same	procedure	repeats	several	times”.		
Emotions	
…Extreme	anxiety	and	fear,	mind	is	awake,	but	body	is	asleep.	I	feel	as	though	I	am	trapped	and	cannot	
communicate	with	those	around	me.	(23-year-old	woman,	USA)	
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	The	most	prevalent	emotion	associated	with	SP	experiences	is	fear.	Indeed,	the	most	natural	reaction	to	waking	up	unable	to	move	is	panic,	and	the	sensation	of	constricted	breathing	(consistent	with	REM	sleep	physiology)	may	increase	the	state	of	distress.	Sharpless	and	colleagues	(2010)	introduced	the	term	fearful	
isolated	sleep	paralysis	to	denote	SP	experiences	characterized	by	an	intense	state	of	distress.	As	much	as	90%	of	reported	SP	episodes	are	described	as	fearful	(Cheyne,	Rueffer,	&	Newby-Clark,	1999).	Similarly,	in	an	Irish	University	students'	sample,	fear	was	found	to	be	the	most	prevalent	emotion,	with	82%	of	respondents	stating	that	they	have	experienced	fear	at	some	point	during	a	SP	episode	(O’Hanlon,	Murphy,	&	Di	Blasi,	2011).	Moreover,	nightmare	frequency	was	previously	reported	as	a	predictor	of	SP	occurrence	(Liskova	et	al,	2016).	This	data	suggests	that	SP,	or	at	least	the	Fearful	form	of	SP,	can	be	seen	as	an	intensified	form	of	a	nightmare:	a	recent	study	by	Robert	and	Zadra	(2014)	reported	that	about	65%	of	nightmares	and	45%	of	bad	dreams	are	characterized	by	fear.		One	approach	to	classify	the	affective	and	personal	impact	of	SP	experiences	is	to	assess	not	only	frequency	or	intensity	of	SP	episodes,	but	also	distress	associated	with	SP	experiences	(Solomonova	et	al,	2008;	Cheyne	&	Pennycook,	2013).	To	what	extent	is	the	individual	affected	by	SP?	To	what	extent	do	negative	emotions	carry-over	from	an	SP	episode	into	waking	life?	Do	SP	experiences	promote	a	negative	relationship	with	sleep?	These	questions	have	been	successfully	examined	in	previous	research	on	nightmares	(Belicki,	1992;	Blagrove,	Farmer	&	Williams,	2004),	showing	that	the	individual	impact	of	negative	and	intense	dream	experiences	depends	more	on	a	trait-like	reactivity,	sometimes	referred	to	as	affect	distress	(Nielsen	&	Levine,	2007).	This	trait	is	thought	to	represent	a	general	dysfunction	of	affect	regulation	network,	and	it	has	been	shown	to	be	a	better	measure	of	how	much	nightmares	influence	waking	life	emotional	well-being	than	frequency	or	intensity	of	self-reported	nightmare	occurrence.	Furthermore,	affect	distress	mediates	reactivity,	negative	interpretation	and	degree	of	negative	reaction	to	nightmares	(Belicki,	1992;	Levin	&	Fireman,	2002).	According	to	Nielsen	and	Levine	(2007;	Levine	&	Nielsen,	2009),	dreaming	helps	regulate	emotional	memory	consolidation	and	emotional	reactivity	via	fear	extinction.	Nightmares,	therefore,	represent	a	case	of	problematic/dysfunctional	processes	of	fear	extinction.	In	combination	with	other	factors,	affect	distress	is	likely	to	play	a	role	in	formation,	experience	and	interpretation	of	SP.	Positive	emotions	associated	with	SP	are	much	less	studied,	and	it	is	not	possible	to	accurately	estimate	their	prevalence.	One	possible	reason	for	this	is	lack	of	appropriate	screening	(SP	is	often	diagnosed	as	an	unpleasant	phenomenon)	and	lack	of	medical/psychiatric	concern:	patients	are	not	very	likely	to	describe	such	experiences	to	their	health	practitioner,	since	they	are	not	bothered	by	them.	In	addition,	the	current	diagnostic	criteria	for	a	recurrent	isolated	SP	as	listed	in	the	latest	edition	of	the	International	
Classification	of	Sleep	Disorders	–	3d	edition	(American	Academy	of	Sleep	Medicine,	2014),	include	that	the	episodes	must	cause	“clinically	significant	distress	including	bedtime	anxiety	or	fear	of	sleep”.	Such	a	provision	would	effectively	exclude	all	possible	positive	and	non-distressing	SP	phenomena	from	investigation	and/or	diagnosis.	Nonetheless,	in	a	web-based	SP	study	Cheyne	(2002)	reports	that	in	addition	to	anger	(30%	of	respondents)	and	sadness	(23%),	bliss	(17%)	and	erotic	sensations	(17%)	are	also	sometimes	present	in	SP.	
Visual	and	auditory	experiences	Felt	presence	is	the	most	prevalent,	the	most	emotionally	disturbing,	and	the	most	salient	SP-related	experience.	Therefore,	it	is	unsurprising	that	most	visual	and	auditory	mentation	during	SP	usually	has	something	to	do	with	these	unwelcome	visitors.	The	entities,	however,	while	felt	in	a	very	distinctive	and	concrete	way,	are	often	described	visually	as	rather	general	and	vague	shadowy	beings.	Visual	experiences	are	reported	to	occur	in	54%–	56%	and	auditory	experiences	in	55%-60%	(Solomonova	et	al,	2008;	Cheyne,	2002)	of	SP	sufferers.		SP	may	be	accompanied	by	auditory	experiences,	ranging	from	abstract	and	mechanical	sounds,	such	as	electric	sounds	and	sounds	of	buzzing,	to	vivid	auditory	imagery,	consistent	with	SP	experience	of	an	
Intruder	or	an	Incubus.	Sounds	of	footsteps	and	of	voices	are	often	reported	(Cheyne,	Rueffer	&	Newby-Clark,	1999;	Cheyne,	2002;	Solomonova	et	al,	2008).			
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Cultural	grounding	of	SP	
		Figure	2.	Henry	Fuseli.	The	Nightmare.	1781.	Detroit	Institute	of	Art.	Public	Domain	image:	https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=15453518			 	While	sleep	paralysis	is	a	lesser-known	sleep	phenomenon	in	the	West,	it	is	quite	prevalent	and	is	well-described	in	many	other	cultures.	Due	to	the	lack	of	general	awareness	of	SP	in	the	West,	it	is	rarely	discussed	in	the	context	of	family	medicine	or	psychology.	Cross-cultural	work	on	SP	revealed	that	it	is	rooted	in	a	variety	of	religious	beliefs	and	cultural	schemas,	including	interpretations	of	the	experience	and	techniques	to	engage	with	the	nocturnal	visitors.	Some	of	the	common	qualities	of	SP	across	cultures	(Adler,	2011)	include:	1)	sensation	of	being	awake;	2)	perception	of	the	environment;	3)	paralysis;	4)	feeling	of	fear	and	dread;	5)	felt	presence;	6)	chest	pressure/breathing	difficulties;	7)	supine	position;	6)	various	unusual	body	sensations.	These	apparently	culturally-invariant	qualities	of	SP-related	occurrences	of	the	experience	of	a	supernatural	attack	have	been	at	the	center	of	the	phenomenological	and	cross-cultural	cognitive	research	on	SP.	Figure	2	is	a	reproduction	of	an	eighteenth-century	work	by	Henri	Fuseli	entitled	The	Nightmare.	It	represents	a	sleeping	woman	in	a	supine	position	being	oppressed	by	a	maleficent	creature	sitting	on	her	chest	and	with	an	ominous	presence	of	the	night-mare.	It	is	likely	that	the	early	use	of	the	English	term	
nightmare	was	to	describe	intense	SP	(Orly	&	Haines,	2014).	Culture-specific	presentations	of	SP-related	felt	presence	experiences	typically	involve	a	maleficent	supernatural	being,	such	as	a	witch	or	an	evil	spirit.	Some	examples	found	across	cultures	include	the	kanashibari	demon	in	Japan	(Fukuda	et	al,	1987;	Arikawa,	Templer	&	Brown,	1999);	kokma	in	the	West	Indies	(Ness,	1983);	“old	hag”	in	Newfoundland	(Hufford,	1989);	
pandafeche	in	Italy	(Jalal,	Romanelli	&	Hinton,	2015);	uqumangirniq	among	the	Inuit	of	Baffin	Island	(Law	&	Kirmayer,	2005);	and	many	others	(for	a	comprehensive	list	of	terms	for	SP	experiences	see	Adler,	2011).	Figure	3	illustrates	a	possible	SP	representation	(Orly	&	Haines,	2014):	a	Japanese	demon	Yamachichi	oppresses	and	inhales	the	breath	of	the	sleeper.	The	first	systematic	cultural	exploration	of	SP	was	done	by	Hufford	(1989):	he	described	a	phenomenon	specific	to	Newfoundland	–	the	“old	hag”	witch	attack.	In	his	book	Hufford	discusses	the	tension	in	situating	SP	experiences	somewhere	between	the	‘cultural	source	hypothesis’,	wherein	cultural	interpretations	and	framing	influence	how	an	experience	unfolds,	and	the	‘experiential	source	hypothesis’,	where	some	invariant	lived	experiences,	such	as	SP,	may	influence	the	development	of	a	spiritual	
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interpretation	and	formation	of	cultural	beliefs	(Hufford	1989,	2005).	Similar	to	this	notion,	McNamara	and	Bulkeley	(2015)	proposed	an	experiential	hypothesis	to	describe	how	dreams	and	other	dream-associated	experiences,	including	visions	and	transcendental	experiences,	can	be	seen	as	a	cornerstone	and	a	source	of	religious	belief	(McNamara	&	Bulkeley,	2015).	According	to	this	view,	a	number	of	cultural,	religious	and	paranormal	beliefs	are	shaped	primarily	by	direct	experience	and	then	framed	within	a	particular	tradition,	which	imbues	them	with	existential	and	metaphysical	meaning,	a	notion	that	is	reminiscent	of	William	James’	grounding	of	mystical	experience	in	the	phenomenology	of	lived	experience	(James,	1985).		The	effect	of	framing	such	intense	subjective	experiences	within	a	cultural	tradition	can	have	at	least	two	kinds	of	potentially	opposing	effects.	On	the	one	hand,	many	cultures	provide	not	only	supernatural	explanations	of	SP,	but	also	remedies	and	protective	rituals	against	it	(some	of	which	are	described	in	the	later	part	of	this	chapter),	thus	rooting	the	SP	in	a	framework	which	allows	for	shared	narrative	and	for	practical	interventions.	On	the	other	hand,	intense	and	fearful	SP,	when	interpreted	as	supernatural	assault,	has	a	potential	for	traumatizing	the	sleeper,	thus	creating	a	vicious	circle	of	anxiety,	aversion	to	sleep,		facilitation	of	future	SP	episodes	(Hinton	et	al,	2005;	Sharpless	et	al,	2010),	and	increasing	the	level	of	distress	via	“cultural	fear	priming”	(Ohayon	et	al,	1999;	Jalal,	Romanelli,	&	Hinton,	2015).	For	instance,	the	Incubus	experience,	when	seen	as	part	of	the	Christian	tradition	starting	with	the	late	Antique	period,	according	to	Gordon	(2015),	gained	additional	stigmatizing	power,	with	a	connotation	of	an	illicit	supernatural	sexual	experience.	Not	only	were	SP	victims	living	through	a	waking	nightmare	of	an	encounter	with	a	demonic	assailant,	they	were	also	seen	as	responsible	for	having	summoned	it	due	to	their	own	sinful	predisposition/thoughts/impurities.	It	is	important	to	note	that	while	SP	can	include	a	range	of	experiences,	such	as	positive	experiences,	neutral	emotions,	vestibulo-motor	phenomena,	out-of-body	experiences,	and	others,	most	cultural	interpretations	of	SP	deal	specifically	with	overlapping	aspects	of	Intruder	and	Incubus.				
	Figure	3.	Takehara	Shunsen.	Yamachichi.	Public	domain	image:	https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=2074508	
Neural	basis,	associated	conditions,	and	precipitating	factors	Human	sleep	is	typically	divided	into	two	kinds:	REM	sleep	and	NREM	sleep.	Healthy	adults	alternate	between	NREM	and	REM	in	cycles	lasting	about	90	minutes,	for	a	total	of	5-6	cycles	over	a	night	of	sleep.	
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While	it	is	possible	to	experience	dreaming	in	all	stages	of	sleep,	REM	sleep	is	typically	characterized	by	the	most	vivid,	realistic,	bizarre,	and	emotionally	intense	sleep	mentation	(Nielsen,	2000).	Other	vivid	dream	experiences,	such	as	nightmares	(Nielsen	&	Levin,	2007)	and	lucid	dreams	(LaBerge,	Levitan	&	Dement,	1986),	are	also	typically	associated	with	REM	sleep.	Within	the	context	of	narcolepsy,	sleep	paralysis	is	a	part	of	the	diagnostic	tetrad,	alongside	daytime	sleepiness,	cataplexy,	and	hypnagogic	hallucinations	(Thorpy,	2016).	There	is	not	sufficient	data	to	assess	whether	there	are	significant	differences	in	phenomenology	between	narcolepsy-associated	SP	and	the	isolated	form.	SP	episodes	are	characterized	by	simultaneous	presence	of	waking	thought	and	of	REM	sleep	psychophysiology	(Mahowald	&	Schenck,	1991,	2005;	Terzaghi	et	al.,	2012),	and	the	sleeper	can	often	open	her	eyes	and	become	relatively	aware	of	her	environment,	while	REM	sleep-related	spontaneous	mentation	-	vivid	dreaming	-	superimposes	onto	otherwise	awake	consciousness.	This	imagery	may	occur	at	sleep	onset	(hypnagogic)	or	upon	awakening	(hypnopompic).	Other	characteristics	of	REM	sleep,	such	as	airway	occlusion	and	rapid	shallow	respiration	(Gould	et	al.,	1988)	may	contribute	to	the	feeling	of	being	suffocated	or	the	perception	of	shortness	of	breath	often	reported	by	SP	sufferers.	Additionally,	in	one	study	obstructive	sleep	apnea	was	found	to	be	a	possible	precipitating	factor	for	ISP	(Hsieh	et	al,	2010).	Little	research	has	been	done	on	the	sleep	characteristics	of	SP	sufferers.	Some	preliminary	data	suggests	that	the	SP	sleep	profile	may	be	similar	to	that	of	frequent	nightmare	sufferers	(Nielsen	et	al,	2010),	in	that	SP	participants	appear,	paradoxically,	to	exhibit	less	REM	sleep	pressure,	have	more	“skipped”	REM	sleep	periods,	and	show	no	increase	in	eye	movement	density	(as	opposed	to	healthy	controls)	throughout	the	night	(Solomonova,	et	al,	2012).	SP	participants	also	show	higher	delta	power	during	sleep	than	non-SP	controls	(Marquis	et	al,	2015),	which	suggests	alteration	of	processes	of	wake-NREM-REM	regulation.	Some	of	the	vestibulo-motor	characteristics,	such	as	autoscopy,	out-of-body	experiences,	and	feelings	of	physical	transformation,	may	stem	from	disturbances	in	right	parietal	regions	(Jalal	&	Ramachandran,	2014):	the	mismatch	between	intended	motor	movement	and	inability	to	move	may	contribute	to	unusual	physical	sensations.	SP	may	be	experimentally	elicited	in	laboratory	settings,	but	only	using	an	arduous	protocol	of	repeated	sleep	interruption.	For	example,	SP	episodes	were	experimentally	induced	by	letting	participants	sleep	uninterrupted	for	the	first	NREM	period,	thus	eliminating	most	of	the	slow-wave	sleep	pressure	(a	tendency	of	slow-wave	NREM	sleep	to	take	precedence	and	occupy	a	large	proportion	of	early	night	sleep),	and	then	repeatedly	awakening	participants	after	5	minutes	of	REM	sleep	have	elapsed,	thus	augmenting	REM	sleep	pressure	and	facilitating	sleep-onset	REM	periods	(SOREMPs).	SOREMPs	may	be	seen	as	a	facilitating	factor	in	a	REM-wake	state	dissociation	thought	to	characterize	SP	experiences.	It	should	be	noted,	however,	that	even	within	such	controlled	settings	and	demanding	protocols,	rates	of	SP	were	relatively	low:	6	episodes	total	in	16	participants	who	already	had	a	tendency	toward	recurrent	isolated	SP	(Takeuchi	et	al.,	1992),	and	8	episodes	from	184	sleep	interruptions	in	13	SP	sufferers	(Takeuchi	et	al,	2002).	These	results	suggest	that	incidence	of	SP	at	sleep	onset	may	signify	an	individual’s	propensity	to	enter	into	REM	sleep	directly	upon	falling	asleep.	This	further	supports	the	idea	that	SP	may	result	from	alterations	in	wake-REM-NREM	regulation	patterns,	resulting	in	state	overlap.		
Associated	conditions	Little	is	known	about	the	epidemiology	of	SP,	but	growing	evidence	points	to	a	combination	of	genetic	and	experiential	factors.	The	only	study	to	date	to	examine	genetic	factors	associated	with	SP	has	reported	moderate	heritability	and	that	this	effect	was	associated	with	factors	known	to	contribute	to	disrupted	sleep	cycles	(Denis	et	al.,	2015).	Sleep	fragmentation	and	disruption	in	wake-NREM-REM	regulation	are	an	important	factor	facilitating	SP	occurrence,	but	it	is	uncertain	whether	all	types	of	SP	can	be	explained	by	a	propensity	for	sleep	fragmentation.	Some	ethnic	groups	seem	to	be	more	likely	to	experience	SP	than	others.	The	Hmong	population	in	Wisconsin,	for	instance,	had	a	significantly	higher	incidence	of	SP	than	a	non-Hmong	cohort	(Young	et	al,	2013),	with	as	much	as	31%	of	interviewed	Hmong	participant	reporting	at	least	weekly	occurrence	of	SP	episodes.	Individuals	of	African	descent	also	seem	to	have	elevated	rates	of	SP	(Bell	et	al,	1984;	Friedman	&	Paradis,	2002).	Links	between	affective	disorders,	especially	depression	and	anxiety,	and	SP	have	also	been	reported.	A	relationship	have	been	found	between	SP	and	depression	magnitude	and	anxiety	(Szklo-Coxe,	Young,	Finn,	&	Mignot,	2007),	social	phobia	and	panic	disorder	(Paradis	&	Friedman,	2005;	Otto	et	al,	2006;	Sharpless	et	al,	2010)	and	social	anxiety	(Simard	&	Nielsen,	2005),	especially	with	the	sensation	of	being	observed	
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(Solomonova	et	al,	2008).	Changes	in	REM	sleep	regulation	are	often	found	in	mood	disorders,	especially	in	depression	(Arargun	&	Cartwright,	2003;	Nofzinger	et	al,	1994)	The	relationship	between	trauma,	especially	post-traumatic	stress	disorder	(PTSD),	and	SP	has	been	noted	by	a	number	of	researchers.	McNally	and	Clancy	found	that	there	was	a	higher	proportion	of	SP	reports	in	participants	with	a	history	of	childhood	sexual	abuse	(McNally	&	Clancy,	2005a),	and	Abrams	and	colleagues	(2008)	reported	that	sexual	abuse	survivors	report	more	distressing	and	more	frequent	SP	incidence.	In	addition,	higher	rates	of	SP	were	found	in	Hmong	population	in	relation	to	traumatic	Vietnam	War	experiences	(Young	et	al,	2013),	as	well	as	in	Khmer	(Hinton	et	al,	2005a)	and	Cambodian	refugees	(Hinton	et	al,	2005b).	Similarly,	Sharpless	and	Grom	(2013)	report	that	some	cases	of	SP	onset	in	adolescents	begin	after	the	loss	of	a	family	member.	Considering	that	SP	may	be	conceptualized	as	a	nightmare	spectrum	experience,	this	relationship	may	represent	the	same	dysfunction	in	the	affect	regulation	network	(Levin	and	Nielsen,	2007;	Nielsen	&	Levin,	2007)	as	the	one	that	has	been	proposed	to	be	involved	in	nightmare	production.	PTSD-related	sleep	disturbances	have	been	extensively	documented	(Spoormaker	&	Montgomery,	2008;	Germain,	Buysse	&	Nofzinger,	2008),	including	REM	sleep	dysregulation	and	increased	nightmares	(Melman	et	al,	2002;	Germain,	2013),	which	in	itself	may	contribute	to	altered	REM	sleep	pressure,	in	turn	facilitating	occurrence	of	SP	episodes.		Since	SP	is	often	associated	with	intense,	detailed,	and	troubling	visions,	a	link	between	SP	and	psychiatric	disorders	has	been	hypothesized.	Research,	however,	shows	no	consistent	relationship	between	psychiatric	conditions	and	SP,	with	the	exceptions	of	PTSD,	panic	disorder,	and	social	anxiety.	In	one	study	a	number	of	links	between	SP	and	psychiatric	conditions	were	found	(Ohayon	et	al.,	1999);	these	findings,were	challenged,	however,	by	an	internet-based	study	(Solomonova	et	al.,	2008),	with	a	larger	sample	size,	in	which	no	strong	links	between	psychopathology	and	SP	were	described.	However,	while	isolated	SP	often	presents	itself	in	the	absence	of	psychopathology,	higher	rates	of	hypnagogic	and	hypnopompic	experiences	(dream	experiences	occurring	during	the	transition	between	sleep	and	wake:	at	sleep	onset	or	upon	awakenings,	respectively),	some	of	which	may	be	associated	with	SP,	are	often	found	in	psychosis	(Plante	and	Winkelman,	2008).		
Precipitating	factors	In	their	recent	book,	Sharpless	and	Doghramji	(2015)	list	a	number	of	plausible	precipitating	factors	for	SP	occurrence	in	susceptible	individuals.	Sleep	fragmentation	and	insufficient	sleep	are	among	the	most	obvious	factors.	REM	sleep	deprivation	has	been	shown	to	increase	REM	sleep	pressure	contributing	to	REM	rebound	effect	and	intensified	dreams	at	sleep	onset	(Nielsen	et	al,	2005).	Poor	sleep	quality	with	frequent	awakenings	and	disruptions	may	also	facilitate	REM-wake	overlap,	creating	fruitful	conditions	for	the	occurrence	of	SOREMPs	(Takeuchi	et	al,	1991,	2002;	Spanos	et	al,	1995).	Shift	work,	jet-lag,	use	of	sleep	disrupting	medication,	stress,	anxiety	–	all	these	factors	affect	sleep	and	may	facilitate	a	SP	episode.	Alcohol	consumption	was	also	reported	to	promote	SP	(Golzari	&	Ghabili,	2013;	Munezawa	et	al,	2011),	probably	due	to	its	effect	on	altering	sleep	architecture	(Roehrs	&	Roth,	2001).	Sleeping	in	a	supine	position	also	appears	to	enhance	the	risk	of	a	SP	episode	(Sharpless	et	al,	2010).			
	
Neurocognitive	considerations	
A	return	to	felt	presence			While	undoubtedly	felt	presences	are	a	hallmark	of	SP,	especially	of	the	intense	and	frightening	episodes,	presence	experiences	are	not	restricted	to	this	parasomnia	and	are	reported	in	a	variety	of	conditions,	thus	possibly	representing	a	more	general	and	basic	social	imagery	process	(Nielsen	2007,	Solomonova,	Frantova	&	Nielsen,	2011).	Arguably,	the	most	salient	and	compelling	felt	presence	occurs	in	the	context	of	mystical	and	spiritual	experiences.	Otto	(1958)	introduced	the	idea	of	the	numinous	as	a	cornerstone	of	religious	mystical	experiences.	Some	of	the	recent	work	comes	from	anthropology:	the	ecstatic	presence	of	God	is	manifested	in	the	community	of	Evangelical	Christians	in	the	USA	(Luhrmann,	2012).	Other	examples	of	felt	presence	have	been	documented	in	situations	that	are	physically	and	emotionally	straining	or	novel.	Some	examples	of	these	experiences	include	high	altitude	climbing	(Brugger,	Regard,	Landis,	&	Oelz,	1999);	feeling	of	the	presence	of	a	baby	in	postpartum	mothers	(Nielsen	&	Paquette,	2007);	presence	of	deceased	relatives	in	the	context	of	bereavement	(Simon-Buller,	Christopherson	&	Jones,	1989;	Taylor,	2005;	Keen,	Murray	&	Payne,	2013);	in	extreme	environments,	such	as	solitary	sailing	(see	also	chapter	by	Suedfeld	
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in	this	volume),	surviving	in	remote	and	hostile	environments	(Suedfeld	&	Mocellin,	1987),	and	others.	While	in	most	cases	felt	presence	is	experienced	spontaneously,	in	some	cases	it	may	be	a	product	of	sustained	mental	practices	(as	in	prayer	and	some	forms	of	meditation).	One	contemporary	non-religious	phenomenon	is	tulpamancy	(Veissiere,	2016)	–	a	long-term	practice	of	conjuring	up	imaginary	companions,	that,	over	time,	may	be	experienced	as	almost	as	real	as	other	people.	Additionally,	being	able	to	have	a	felt	sense	of	others	may	be	seen	as	a	prerequisite	for	the	development	of	subjectivity.	Recent	work	in	phenomenology	and	enactivism	suggests	that	development	of	sense	of	self	depends	crucially	on	sensing	others,	as	early	as	in	utero	(Gallagher,	2005;	Ammaniti	&	Gallese,	2014),	that	the	sense	of	one’s	own	body	depends	on	the	sense	of	others	(Maclaren,	2008)	and	that	the	self-other	dynamic	is	a	necessary	condition	for	the	sense	of	self	(Zahavi,	2014).	Evidence	from	dream	research	too	suggests	that	dream	processes	are	relational	and	intersubjective.	The	fact	that	dreams	are	most	often	about	other	people	has	been	conceptualized	as	simulations	of	social	interaction	(Revonsuo,	2016)	and	as	representations	of	individual	attachment	styles	(McNamara	et	al,	2001).	Additionally,	dreams,	similarly	to	waking,	can	be	seen	as	a	dynamic	interaction	between	the	“self”-related	and	“non-self”	elements	of	dream	content	(everything	extraneous	to	the	dreamer).	These	non-self	elements	(non-human	characters,	dream	environment,	even	dream	objects	can	be	seen	as	a	“dream	other”	due	to	their	inherent	relational	property	(Solomonova	et	al	2015)	and	to	the	fact	that	dream	environment	in	its	entirety	affectively	motivates	dreamer	to	engage	with	it.	.		
Toward	a	cultural	neurophenomenology	of	SP	
		 SP	has	often	been	characterized	as	dissociative	(Terzaghi	et	al.,	2012)	state,	since	it	effectively	combines	characteristics	of	'waking'	consciousness	(self-awareness,	access	to	autobiographical	memory,	ability	to	open	eyes	and	perceive	the	environment)	with	REM-sleep	phenomena,	specifically	muscle	atonia/paralysis	and	mentation/dreams.	This	notion	of	SP	as	dissociative	has	been	at	the	heart	of	the	previous	neurobiological	work	on	the	link	between	dreaming	and	REM	sleep.	The	relative	deactivation	of	the	dorsolateral	prefrontal	cortex	characteristic	of	REM	sleep	(Hobson,	Stickgold	&	Pace-Schott,	1988;	Maquet,	2000)	has	been	long	hypothesized	to	be	at	the	root	of	the	loss	of	autobiographic	memory	and	of	the	inability	to	appreciate	the	contents	of	the	dream	as	"bizarre"	or	implausible	in	relation	to	reality.	This	has	led	to	the	hypothesis	that	in	REM	sleep	dreaming	one	is	effectively	delusional	and	in	a	state	of	a	transient	psychosis	(Hobson,	2004).	In	SP,	similarly,	there	is	often	incomplete	autobiographical	access.	This	association	between	SP	and	REM	sleep	has	also	displaced	the	experience	of	SP	from	the	psycho-spiritual	domain	of	meaningful	encounters	with	menacing/unreal/supernatural	others,	into	a	more	reductionist	account	of	uncontrollable	and	inescapable	REM-initiated	hallucinations.			 In	contrast,	an	account	of	SP	in	the	context	of	an	oneiric	phenomenology	and	in	a	4EA	perspective	may	allow	for	a	more	nuanced	reading	of	these	experiences.	An	emerging	neurophenomenological	framework	of	sleep	challenges	strict	distinctions	between	wake,	NREM,	and	REM	sleep.	Indeed,	while	SP	is	one	of	the	examples	of	simultaneous	presence	of	REM	sleep	and	wake	processes,	it	is	not	the	only	phenomenon	that	attests	to	the	fluidity	and	interpermeability	of	states	of	consciousness.	Lucid	dreaming	is	another	example	of	REM-wake	co-occurrence	(LaBerge,	1986);	REM	sleep	behaviour	disorder	is	characterized	by	preserved	motor	output	during	REM	dreaming	(Peever,	Luppi	&	Montplaisir,	2014);	somnambulism	episodes	combine	NREM	and	wake	physiology	and	phenomenology	(Zadra	et	al,	2004);	and	a	variety	of	dream-enacting	behaviours,	such	as	laughing,	simple	movement,	crying	and	looking	for	a	baby	in	bed,	are	prevalent	in	normal	populations	(Nielsen	&	Paquette,	2007;	Nielsen,	Svob	&	Kuiken,	2010).		A	more	continuous	view	of	mentation	in	sleep	includes	viewing	SP	as	a	form	of	oneiric	experience:	as	a	process	of	intensified	mind-wandering	(Fox	et	al,	2013),	as	a	process	of	creativity	(Hartmann	&	Kunzendorf,	2013),	or	as	enactive	imagination	(Thompson,	2014),	a	process	of	sense-making	in	a	rich,	embodied	and	intersubjective	world	(Solomonova	&	Sha,	2016).	In	his	discussion	of	lucid	dreaming,	Thompson	(2014)	proposes	that	in	addition	to	seeing	this	state	as	a	dissociative	superimposition	of	two	distinct	states	of	consciousness,	it	may	be	simultaneously	approached	as	an	integrative	state,	thus	allowing	for	an	integration	of	two	different	yet	related	ways	of	self-experience.		While	SP	sufferers	feel	awake	and	in	their	own	bed,	the	realism	of	the	experience	and	the	quality	of	total	immersion	are	completely	overpowering	to	the	dreamer,	so	that	she	is	unable	to	appreciate	the	dreamlike	quality	or	the	unreality	of	the	SP	episode.	The	high	prevalence	of	tactile	and	physical	sensations	
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probably	contributes	to	this	effect.	There	are,	however,	numerous	accounts	of	long-time	SP	experiencers	that	are	characterized	by	a	certain	'feel'	for	the	experience	as	somewhere	between	real	and	unreal.	SP-related	experiences	may	have	a	very	compelling	and	realistic	quality,	but	they	are	usually	lived	differently	from	waking	experiences,	as	a	kind	of	a	liminal	state.	Consider	the	following	example:	while	the	participant	is	experiencing	intense	emotion	and	is	quite	absorbed	in	the	unfolding	on	the	SP,	he	seems	to	have	a	kind	of	a	dual	awareness	regarding	the	nature	of	his	SP:	 “…Can’t.	Move.	Not	a	muscle.	Not	an	eyelash.	It's	often	accompanied	by	hallucinations.	So	this	
bizarre	or	terrifying	event	is	happening	all	around	me,	and	I	am	completely	unable	to	respond	
or	defend	myself.	Sometimes	I	know	it's	not	real,	somewhere	in	my	mind,	but	it	looks	real,	and	it	
sounds	real,	and	I'm	terrified	or	revolted	(or	maybe	just	bemused),	but	I	cannot	wake	myself	up	
to	stop	it.”	(30-year-old	man,	USA)	Similarly,	in	another	example	the	experiencer	is	also	hesitant	to	ascribe	any	particular	state	to	her	experience:	“…	I	might	be	answering	wrong,	because	I	see	the	beings	in	my	dream-state	immediately	before	
waking.	But	their	presence	seems	so	real,	I	would	compare	the	experience	to	having	them	
accompanying	me	in	the	room”.	(48-year-old	woman,	USA)		 Grounding	SP	in	its	cultural	context	allows	us	to	appreciate	the	variety	of	factors	contributing	to	qualities	of	the	lived	experience,	and	it	may	not	be	possible	to	dissect	the	relative	contribution	of	the	multitude	of	neural,	phenomenological	and	cultural	narrative	factors	(Kirmayer,	2009).	Importantly,	in	the	current	medical	context,	reducing	SP	to	a	dysfunction	of	REM	psychophysiology	may	also	have	an	important	effect	on	reducing	the	potential	for	a	deeper	exploration	of	SP	as	a	spiritual	experience	(Hufford,	2005).		The	cultural	neurophenomenology	of	SP	is	a	powerful	tool	for	investigating	SP	from	the	4EA	cognition	perspective.	As	neurophysiological,	experiential	accounts	of	SP	show,	the	dreamer	is	in	fact	embodied	–	the	oneiric	scenario	is	dependent	on	the	dreamer’s	state	of	consciousness	(REM	intrusion)	and	on	the	dreamer’s	physiological	state	(atonia,	shallow	rapid	breathing).	She	is	embedded	in	a	physical	(interprets	ambiguous	stimuli	around	her)	and	in	a	cultural	world	(these	ambiguous	stimuli	take	on	a	familiar	shape/are	infused	with	a	deeper	cultural	and	interpersonal	signification).	The	sleeper	is	also	extended	into	the	world	–	the	whole	environment,	both	dreamt	and	real,	is	part	of	her	ongoing	experience;	and	her	experience	is	enactive	–	there	is	a	relational	quality:	she	is	not	a	passive	observer	of	the	oneiric	drama	unfolding	before	her	eyes,	but	rather	she	is	deeply	engaged	(Solomonova	&	Sha,	2016).		In	order	to	elucidate	neurophenomenological	qualities	of	SP	in	greater	detail,	future	work	may	use	microdynamic	phenomenology/elicitation	interviews,	aimed	at	uncovering	the	fine-grained	temporal	and	structural	qualities	of	lived	experience	(Nielsen,	this	volume;	Petitmengin,	2006;	Petitmengin	&	Lachaux,	2013),	in	addition	to	neurophysiological	data	and	deep	awareness	of	the	cultural,	religious	and	spiritual	context	of	the	experiencer.	
Sleep	paralysis	practices:	prevention,	disruption,	treatment	and	exploration	While	SP	remains	a	relatively	unknown	phenomenon	in	much	of	Europe	and	America,	a	number	of	practical	culture-specific	practices	have	been	developed	to	protect	the	sleeper	from	the	negative	influence	of	presumed	supernatural	forces.	While	some	of	these	methods	have	deep	roots	in	their	respective	metaphysical	contexts,	and	therefore	need	to	be	grounded	in	existing	religious	and	mystical	practices,	a	number	of	practical	and	conceptually	neutral	recommendations	have	emerged,	and	seem	beneficial	for	most	SP	sufferers,	regardless	of	background.	No	established	treatment	for	SP	currently	exists;	its	clinical	management	is	instead	often	focused	on	treating	comorbid	problems.	According	to	a	review	by	Sharpless	&	Doghramji	(2015),	psychoanalysis,	cognitive-behavioural	therapy	(CBT),	hypnosis,	and	education	in	sleep	hygiene	have	been	investigated	in	relation	to	SP,	but	no	empirical	consensus	on	efficacy	of	such	interventions	is	currently	available.	Based	on	the	available	evidence	on	SP	and	cognitive-behavioural	approaches	to	treatment	of	sleep	disorders,	especially	insomnia,	the	authors	propose	a	manual	for	CBT-ISP.	This	is	a	promising	first	step	toward	finding	a	systematic	method	of	dealing	with	SP.	Sparse	evidence	for	pharmacological	interventions	for	SP	also	exists:	in	one	study	it	was	suggested	that	REM	sleep-suppressing	antidepressants	may	provide	temporary	relief	(Plante	and	Winkelman,	2008),	and	treatment	of	narcolepsy	may	reduce	SP	frequency	(Mamelak	et	al.,	2004).	
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Antidepressants	and	anxiolytics	were	also	used	in	severe	cases	(Hsieh	et	al.,	2010).	Terrillon	and	Marques-Bonham	(2001)	proposed	that	management	of	SP	might	benefit	from	administration	of	melatonin,	which	would	help	normalize	the	circadian	rhythm.	The	cost	of	side	effects	associated	with	these	treatments,	however,	may	outweigh	the	benefit,	and	Shapless	and	Doghramji	(2015)	argue	for	a	cautious	approach,	tailored	to	each	individual	situation.	While	methods	for	dealing	with	sleep	paralysis	have	not	been	systematically	explored	by	empirical	psychology	or	cognitive	science,	the	contemporary	context	of	Internet-facilitated	support	groups	and	information	sharing	practices	are	changing	the	solitary	and	culture-bound	nature	of	SP	attacks.	Furthermore,	a	number	of	methods	have	been	anecdotally	reported	and	documented	online	and	in	print,	that	see	SP	experiences	as	an	opportunity	rather	than	a	nuisance,	and	promote	exploration	of	one’s	own	consciousness	via	SP-supported	lucid	dreaming	or	even	contemplative	approaches	to	SP	(Hurd,	2010).	One	popular	support	group-mailing	list	is	known	as	“Awareness	during	sleep	paralysis”	(ASP),	and	a	reddit	group	on	SP	counts	over	4000	users,	sharing	information	on	the	phenomenology	of	their	experiences	and	methods	of	overcoming	them.		 Cultural	and	clinical	practices	associated	with	SP	can	be	roughly	separated	into	three	kinds:	1)	preventative	practices,	focused	on	avoiding	SP-enabling	circumstances;	2)	disruptive	practices,	designed	to	stop	SP	in	the	middle	of	the	experience;	and	3)	observational/explorative	practices,	aiming	at	observing	SP	and	possibly	transforming	it	into	a	positive	event,	such	as	a	lucid	dream	or	an	out-of-body	experience.		Raising	awareness	of	SP-associated	phenomena	itself	may	be	one	of	the	most	important	factors	in	reducing	fear	and	distress	before,	during	and	after	SP	occurrence	(Otto	et	al.,	2006;	Sharpless	et	al,	2010).	Indeed,	knowing	that	the	experience	is	transient	(will	not	last),	benign	(does	not	contain	any	real	danger),	and	common	(is	shared	with	many	individuals	across	the	world)	are	powerful	tools	for	psychological	distancing	and	for	facilitating	an	eventual	observational,	as	opposed	to	fully	immersive	and	fatalistic,	attitude	toward	SP.	Knowing	about	SP	phenomenology	and	neurophysiology	and	having	access	to	cultural	grounding	with	available	symbolic	gestures	helps	prevent,	disrupt	and	transform	a	negative	experience	into	a	tool	for	self-exploration.	Figure	4	summarizes	the	intricate	links	between	precipitating	factors	and	effects	of	SP	experiences	in	light	of	disruptive,	and	observational/transformational	practices.		
Methods	for	preventing	sleep	paralysis	While	undoubtedly	helpful,	simply	knowing	the	basis	of	SP	may	not	be	enough	to	alleviate	terror	and	distress	associated	with	the	experiences,	and	disruption	techniques	are	clearly	warranted.	A	25-year-old	man	from	the	United	States	reports:	“This	happens	sometimes	every	night,	sometimes	only	once	every	few	weeks.	Even	though	I	'know'	what	is	happening,	and	that	I	am	in	no	danger,	it	is	always	terrifying”.	The	first	study	to	systematically	assess	prevention	strategies	for	SP	by	Sharpless	and	Grom	(2014)	has	suggested	that	while	no	foolproof	method	for	preventing	SP	is	yet	known,	some	strategies,	such	as	avoiding	sleeping	on	one’s	back	(supine	position),	maintaining	optimal	sleep	hygiene	(avoiding	stimulants,	noise,	irregular	sleep	patterns	and	anything	that	contributes	to	sleep	fragmentation),	and	pre-sleep	relaxation	practices	may	help	in	preventing	SP.	 A	number	of	culture-specific	preventative	ritualistic	measures	to	prevent	SP	exist.	These	include	placing	a	variety	of	defensive	objects	in	the	room	or	in	the	bed	before	going	to	sleep,	such	as	a	variety	of	knives	(Hufford,	1982,	Law	&	Kirmayer,	2005);	sprinkling	salt	(a	common	anti-witch	remedy)	(Roberts,	1998);	putting	a	broom	bottom-up	(Paradis	&	Friedman,	2005)	or	a	pile	of	sand	at	the	bedroom	door	(Jalal,	Romanelli	&	Hinton,	2015);	and	many	others.	Putting	a	Bible	in	the	room	(Hufford,	1982)	and	saying	a	protective	prayer	before	bedtime	are	also	thought	of	as	effective	deterrents.	Other	ritualistic	actions,	designed	to	deter,	divert	and	chase	away	unwelcome	supernatural	visitors	were	also	documented	in	a	variety	of	contexts	(Sharpless	&	Doghramji,	2015).		
Techniques	for	disrupting	sleep	paralysis	While	preventative	measures,	whether	culturally	embedded	or	aimed	at	increased	awareness	and	promotion	of	sleep	hygiene,	may	be	effective	in	reducing	the	frequency	of	SP	episodes,	many	methods	for	dealing	with	an	ongoing	SP	experience	also	exist.	Considering	that	most	SP	experiences	are	characterized	by	
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fear	and	other	unpleasant	sensations,	it	is	not	surprising	that	in	one	study	the	majority	of	participants	reported	having	attempted	to	disrupt	the	ongoing	SP	experience.	Moving	the	extremities	and	self-monitoring	(raising	awareness,	promoting	calm)	may	be	helpful	during	the	SP	episode	(Sharpless	&	Grom,	2014).	Not	all	attempts	or	all	strategies	are	equally	successful,	but	it	seems	that	attempting	micro	movements,	instead	of	trying	to	get	up	or	to	scream,	are	most	effective.	Culture-bound	rituals	include	saying	a	prayer	(Hufford,	1982),	making	a	sign	of	a	cross	with	one’s	tongue	(Davies,	2010),	and	asking	someone	to	physically	shake	the	oppressed	sleeper	(Law	and	Kirmayer,	2005).	
Observational/transformational	practices	One	may	argue	that	ISP	and	lucid	dreaming	are	polar	opposites.	However,	they	share	the	same	underlying	psychophysiology	and	seem	to	involve	similar	mechanisms:	both	are	dependent	upon	REM	sleep	mechanisms;	both	are	characterized	by	simultaneous	presence	of	the	dream	state	and	by	the	feeling	of	being	awake,	including	activation	of	higher	order	metacognitive	functions	indicative	of	some	degree	of	waking	thought	processes	(LaBerge,	Levitan	&	Dement,	1986;	Voss,	Holzmann,	Tuin,	&	Hobson,	2009;	Dresler	et	al,	2012;	Filevich	et	al,	2015);	and	in	both	cases	muscle	atonia	is	present.	The	crucial	difference	between	the	two	states	is	the	quality	and	the	focus	of	awareness	and	metacognition:	in	lucid	dreaming	one	is	aware	of	the	illusory	nature	of	the	dream	scenario,	whereas	in	SP	the	dreamer	is	often	absorbed	by	the	vision,	not	always	fully	realizing	that	it	is	dreamlike,	and,	in	case	of	fearful	SP,	is	too	absorbed	in	the	panicky	state	of	perceived	imminent	danger.	The	link	between	SP	and	lucid	dreaming	has	not	been	systematically	investigated	in	empirical	research,	but	two	studies	report	a	positive	correlation	between	frequency	of	lucid	dreaming	and	SP	(Denis	&	Poerio,	2016;	Solomonova,	Nielsen	&	Stenstrom,	2009),	suggesting	that	the	REM-wake	intertwined	state,	characterizing	SP,	may	be	a	trait-like	phenomenon	predisposing	individuals	to	SP	on	the	one	hand,	and	facilitating	lucidity	in	REM	sleep	dreams	on	the	other.	Transforming	SP	into	a	positive	experience,	such	as	an	OBE	or	a	lucid	dream,	or	utilizing	SP	experiences	as	a	means	of	contemplative	insight	into	one’s	own	mind,	may	become	a	practice	in	itself,	since	not	only	techniques	for	disrupting	and	preventing	SP	exist	in	the	contemporary	digital	culture,	but	also	techniques	for	inducing	SP,	with	the	hope	that	the	experience	will	function	as	a	portal	to	a	desirable	altered	state	of	consciousness	(Hurd,	2010).	The	following	two	reports	illustrate	the	transformative	potential	of	SP:		
“I	have	woken	up	from	dreaming	and	found	I	can’t	move	or	open	my	eyes.	I	get	the	feeling	of	
lemonade	bubbling	in	my	body,	especially	my	head.	It	is	very	frightening.	But	since	I	have	been	
having	OBE3s	I	now	relax	and	go	with	the	flow	of	sleep	paralysis	and	sometimes	I	actually	
achieve	an	OBE”	(40-year-old	man,	Australia)		
“At	first	I	was	very	frightened	until	I	found	the	ASP	email	group	and	found	that	I	was	not	the	
only	one	being	“visited”	by	this	being	during	sleep	paralysis.	…	When	it	first	started	happening	
it	was	more	of	an	assault	and	I	had	to	fight	terribly	to	escape.	But	after	years,	I	learned	to	
ignore	and	now	I’ve	been	trying	to	communicate	with	the	presence”.	(40-year-old	man,	USA)		
                                                       3	OBE	=	out-of-body	experience	
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	Figure	4.	Predisposing,	precipitating	factors	and	experience	and	outcome	of	sleep	paralysis	episodes.		
Further	considerations	and	future	directions	In	terms	of	possible	avenues	for	treatment,	since	SP	can	be	conceptualized	as	a	form	of	nightmare	occurring	in	a	mixed	state	of	consciousness,	nightmare	treatment	techniques	could	be	useful	in	approaching	SP.	Currently,	the	most	used	and	recommended	technique	for	treating	chronic	nightmares	is	the	Imagery	Rehearsal	Therapy	(Krakow	et	al,	1995;	Krakow	&	Zadra,	2006),	which	consists	of	“rehearsing”	and	transforming	dysphoric	oneiric	imagery	in	a	safe	context.	This	method	has	been	effective	in	treating	PTSD-related	nightmares	(Krakow	et	al,	2001;	Germain	et	al,	2004;	Cook	et	al,	2010;	Casement	&	Swanson,	2012),	which	seems	particularly	appropriate	for	intense	and	trauma-related	SP	experiences.	Similarly,	treatment	of	nightmares	by	lucid	dreaming	is	a	promising	avenue	(Zadra	&	Pihl,	1997;	Spoormaker	&	Van	Den	Bout,	2006;	LaBerge,	2009).	Considering	that	neurophysiologically	both	states	are	characterized	by	an	overlap	between	REM	sleep	and	wakefulness,	and	that	a	number	of	folk	approaches	treating	SP	as	a	portal	to	lucid	dreams	already	exist,	mastering	lucid	dreaming	could	be	an	effective	approach	to	transformation	of	an	ongoing	SP	episode.	Such	a	strategy	may	also	be	highly	effective	in	de-stigmatizing	and	desensitising	the	experiencer,	and	especially	in	increasing	her	mastery	and	agency	over	her	spontaneous	oneiric	experiences.		Contemplative	practices,	such	as	meditation	or	pranayama	(yogic	breathing)	may	also	be	useful	in	dealing	with	recurring	SP	episodes.	There	is	currently	no	empirical	evidence	for	contemplative	techniques	and	SP	management,	with	the	exception	of	a	case	study	by	Jalal	(2016),	but	anecdotal	evidence	from	practitioners	as	well	as	growing	empirical	literature	linking	contemplative	practices	with	stress	management,	emotion	regulation,	and	increased	self-awareness,	provide	grounds	for	future	research.	 	Recent	years	have	seen	an	important	increase	in	empirical	studies	on	the	effects	of	meditation	and	meditation-based	mindfulness	interventions.	There	are	documented	benefits	of	contemplative	practice	in	clinical	populations	including	positive	effects	in	mood	disorders	such	as	anxiety	and	depression	(Hoffman	et	al,	2010;	Goyal	et	al,	2014),	social	anxiety	(Goldin	&	Gross,	2010),	and	PTSD	(Kearney	et	al,	2013).	At	least	four	kinds	of	meditation	are	currently	investigated	in	relation	to	mental	health:	focused	attention,	open	monitoring	(Lutz	et	al,	2008),	self-transcendence	(Travis	&	Shear,	2010)	and	loving	kindness	meditation	(Hoffman,	Grossman	&	Hinton,	2011).	Different	kinds	of	meditation	practices	may	recruit	different	neural	networks	(Fox	et	al,	2016),	and	particular	psychological	and	neuroplastic	changes,	associated	with	meditation	practice,	likely	depend	on	the	kind	and	duration	of	meditation	experience	(Lutz	et	al,	2015).	These	different	kinds	of	contemplative	practice	may	be	helpful	in	targeting	different	kinds	of	recurrent	SP	experiences,	promoting	de-automatization	(Kang,	Gruber	&	Gray,	2013):	deconstructing	patterns	of	behaviour/reactivity.	
 
 
18 
Meditation	may	be	effective	in	SP	management	as	a	way	of	cultivating	a	non-judgemental	or	‘non-sticky’	observational	attitude	to	arising	imagery,	sensations	and	emotions,	and	in	letting	the	experience	unfold.	In	addition,	one	important	feature	of	most	mindfulness-related	practices	is	the	focus	on	the	experience	of	the	body	(Kerr	et	al,	2013),	and	some	evidence	suggests	that	meditation	practice	may	improve	awareness	of	one’s	own	body	states	(Solomonova	et	al,	2016)	and	increase	introspective	accuracy	for	somatic	experience	(Fox	et	al,	2012).	Breathing	practices,	such	as	pranayama,	may	be	particularly	effective	in	transforming	SP	as	it	is	happening	due	to	the	fact	that	many	SP	episodes	are	characterised	by	a	feeling	of	disordered/insufficient	breathing.	A	recent	study	(Seppälä	et	al,	2014)	reported	that	breathing	exercises	were	effective	in	decreasing	PTSD	symptoms	in	war	veterans.	This	implies	that	practicing	techniques	that	improve	awareness	of	body	sensations	may	lower	the	reactivity	to	SP	episodes,	thus	lowering	the	distressing	quality	of	the	experience,	and	increasing	the	potential	for	disrupting	or	transforming	SP.	
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